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BONUS-MALUS SYSTEMS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT:
FORECASTING MARKET SHARES USING DIFFUSION MODELS
BY
KRUPA S. VISWANATHAN AND JEAN LEMAIRE
ABSTRACT
In a deregulated insurance market, insurance carriers have an incentive to be
innovative in their pricing decisions by segmenting their portfolios and designing
new bonus-malus systems (BMS). This paper examines the evolution of market
shares and claim frequencies in a two-company market, when one insurer breaks
off the existing stability by introducing a super-discount class in its BMS.
Several assumptions concerning policyholders and insurers behavior are tested.
Diffusion theory is used to model the spread of the information concerning the
new BMS among prospective customers. A wide variety of market outcomes
results: one company may take over the market or the two may survive with
equal or unequal market shares, each specializing in a specific niche of the
market. Before engaging in an aggressive competitive behavior, insurers should
consequently be reasonably confident in their assumptions concerning the reac-
tions of their policyholders to the new BMS.
KEYWORDS
Bonus-malus systems, rating freedom, competition, diffusion processes, exter-
nal and internal communication coefficients.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of complete rating freedom in non-life insurance in the
European Union (EU) in July 1994 (Third Directive 92/49/EEC), insurers have
been given the opportunity to be innovative in their pricing decisions, to introduce
more classification variables and to design new bonus-malus systems (BMS).
The European Commission has sent a clear message that the use of a mandatory
BMS by all insurers of a given country is a practice that violates competition
regulation.
In countries like Italy and Portugal, companies have taken advantage of new
conditions to engage in very competitive strategies, based in part on aggressive
BMS. Following the EU Directive, Portuguese companies have moved very
quickly from a simple, six-class BMS to widely differentiated systems, actively
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promoted and advertised. A recent survey (Portugal, 2001) mentions no less
than 33 different BMS, with a number of classes that varies between 12 and
28 and maximum bonuses that range between 30% and 60%; the number of
claim-free years to reach the highest discount from start can be as low as two
and as high as 17. Many companies have reacted to their newly found freedom
by expanding the number of BMS classes, mostly the bonus classes. The cur-
rent average number of classes is 17, up from six in the old system. Only two
companies have kept the former maximum bonus of 30%. The vast majority
of insurers have moved to a maximum bonus of 50%, with several awarding
discounts of even 55% or 60%.
Insurers in other European countries have not reacted as aggressively as the
Portuguese to the EU Directive. They appear to compete mostly on the basis
of increased segmentation through the use of more a priori classification vari-
ables, rather than creative BMS design. Insurer associations in Belgium, France,
and Luxembourg have taken legal action to exclude BMS from the range of
application of the Directive and keep the idea of a uniform BMS mandatory
for all companies. France and Luxembourg have scored an unexpected victory
in court, and legal proceedings are still pending.
Belgian insurers have been successful in delaying BMS rating freedom by
enforcing the idea of a smooth landing, a progressive elimination of their manda-
tory BMS. It is only since January 1, 2004, that Belgian carriers are free to design
their own BMS. Policyholders switching companies must obtain from their
former insurer a certificate indicating their claims history over the last five years;
the new insurer may then use this information to determine the entry class
into its own BMS. As of November 2004, it appears that few companies have
taken advantage of rating freedom to introduce major deviations from the
former BMS that had 23 classes, premiums levels ranging from 54 to 200, a one-
class discount per claim-free year, and a five-class penalty per claim. One com-
pany has added two “super-bonus” classes at level 54. Another company has
created four “super-bonus” classes with higher discounts.
One reason for the lack of an aggressive BMS policy in countries like
Belgium or France could be insurer uncertainty concerning the outcome of
unbridled competition. Insurers do not know whether the introduction of
a more efficient BMS will attract good or bad drivers, or result in an increased
or decreased market share. Another reason could be policyholder information,
or lack thereof, in automobile insurance. The well-known assertion by Joskow
(1973): “There is no other product for which consumer ignorance is so preva-
lent” is still applicable today. While most European drivers know that their
premium depends on their car model and that they are subject to some form
of merit-rating, only a minority knows its BMS premium level and the num-
ber of penalty classes in case of an accident. It is much easier for insurers to
advertise immediate discounts for suburban female drivers than to explain that
a more efficient BMS will, in the long run, lead to decreased premiums for the
better drivers.
The introduction of a new BMS represents an innovation in an automobile
insurance market. In revising its system from a government-prescribed system,
an insurer chooses the number of classes, the premium levels, and the transition
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rules, each of which affording much flexibility. Through its system construction,
an insurer may try to implement certain marketing strategies: attract the bet-
ter drivers, capture market share, improve profitability, etc.
A BMS is a sophisticated innovation for which the learning requirements
for prospective customers are high. Developing the ability to compare these sys-
tems takes time and initiative. Some drivers may have a short-term view, only
comparing their premium for the next period, while others may assess their
future claim probabilities and choose an insurer and its BMS accordingly.
Companies need to promote their BMS and inform future customers. Advertis-
ing is a highly effective marketing tool to spread information concerning a new
product, but advertising alone is not enough to educate policyholders. Word-
of-mouth among drivers and brokers is probably just as essential in getting a
large segment of the population informed.
In this article we shall use diffusion theory, a tool that has been used min-
imally in actuarial science, to model the spread of information about a new
BMS among policyholders. We shall explore market outcomes (evolution of
market shares and claim frequencies) in a deregulated environment, using a
variety of assumptions about policyholder behavior and insurers’ strategies.
In section 2, the main deterministic models of diffusion theory are introduced.
A survey of the theory can be found in De Palma, Droesbeke, and Lefèvre (1991)
and Mahajan and Wind (1986). In section 3, our basic model of the competi-
tion between two companies is provided. Section 4 presents the results of our
benchmark scenario. In section 5, eight other scenarios are introduced. They
lead to a wide variety of market outcomes. It is concluded in section 6 that
the knowledge of a market and its consumers is crucial to the implementation
of a successful BMS strategy. Note that, with the exception of an article by Fels
(1995), there has been little research done on BMS in a competitive environ-
ment. This research extends a discussion by Subramanian (1998).
2. DIFFUSION THEORY
Deregulation in insurance markets provides a timely opportunity for the incor-
poration of models of diffusion theory into actuarial science. In a diffusion
process, an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time
among the members of a social system. Diffusion theory can model the spread
of a new product from its manufacturer to ultimate users. Communication of
information can occur through the combination of two processes: advertising
and word-of-mouth. These two processes will be first considered separately before
being integrated.
2.1. The Advertising Process
The simplest model representing the spread of information in a closed group
of individuals formalizes an idea of Fourt and Woodlock (1960). Assume a
group of N persons (N constant) is partitioned into two sub-groups: the group
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S(t) of people who have not yet heard about the new product by time t, and
the group I (t) = N – S(t) of people who have learned about the new product,
the “informed”. Uninformed individuals learn about the innovation only through
sources external to the social group: radio and television ads, newspapers, bill-
boards. Denote a as the external communication coefficient, a ∈ [0, 1], the
strength of those external influences. During time interval (t, t + Dt), each indi-
vidual in group S(t) learns about the new product with probability aDt, inde-
pendently of all other individuals. During time interval (t, t + Dt), the rate of
transition from class S(t) to class I (t) is a [N – I (t)]. Then, the total number of
informed individuals at time t + Dt is
I (t + Dt) = I (t) + a [N – I (t)] Dt
Assuming that time is measured in fairly small time intervals, we can use a
differential equation as an approximation. Dividing by Dt and taking the limit
for Dt → 0 leads to the linear differential equation
dt
dI t
a N I t= -] ]g g6 @
with solution
I t N N I t e a t t0 0= - - - -] ] ]g g g6 @
where t0 is the time of introduction of the new product, and I (t0) represents
the initial number of informed individuals, possibly 0. The number of informed
people forms an increasing and concave curve. I(t) asymptotically tends to the
population size N. Consider a group of 1000 individuals, none of whom is
informed at time 0. Figure 1-1 depicts the increase in informed individuals over
time, for various values of a.
2.2. The Word-of-Mouth Process
Mansfield (1961) considers only the word-of-mouth effect in the spread of infor-
mation. Assume that a population of size N lives in a volume V of dimension
1, 2, or 3, and that the N individuals are uniformly distributed in V. It is rea-
sonable to assume that uninformed individuals from S(t) can only learn from
informed individuals I (t) who live close to them. Suppose that only the indi-
viduals of group I (t) from a given sub-volume DV can inform an individual
in group S(t) living in the same DV. The number of informed and non-informed
in DV at time t are equal to I (t)DV/V and [N – I (t)]DV/V, respectively. Con-
sequently, there are I (t)[N – I (t)](DV/V )2 different pairs of informed/non-
informed in DV. Assume that any individual can meet at most one other indi-
vidual during time interval (t, t + Dt). Let c be the rate of contact between an
uninformed/informed pair in DV. As V contains (V/DV) sub-volumes DV, the
total number of persons switching from S to I during (t, t + Dt) is 
I (t) [N – I (t)](DV/V )2cDt (V/DV)
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The transition rate from class S to class I is then 
dt
dI t] g = I (t) [N – I (t)]cDV/V = bI (t) [N – I (t)] / N
where b = cDVr and r = N/V is the density of individuals in volume V. b is
called the word-of-mouth communication coefficient, and, in the above formu-
lation, is independent of N. Parameter b, b ∈ [0,N ], measures the effectiveness
of word-of-mouth as an information spreader. It is a function of the degree
of knowledge and interest that individuals possess as well as media intensity.
The potential number of contacts between an informed and an uninformed is
I (t) [N – I (t)] . Thus, b/N is the probability that an informed individual meets
an uninformed and that the contact leads to information spread. This proba-
bility is affected by the population size; as N increases, the probability that
this particular contact between an informed/uninformed takes place becomes
smaller.
The solution of this Ricatti non-linear differential equation is 
I t
I t
N I t
e
N
1 b t t
0
0 0
=
+
- - -
]
] ] ]
g
g g g
This is the well-known logistic curve, which is increasing, first convex then
concave, and tends asymptotically to N. The inflection point is I (t) = N /2. At
first, the number of informed persons grows slowly, as few people know about
the new product. Then a snowballing effect begins, culminating at the inflection
point, the maximum rate of information spread, when exactly half the popu-
lation is informed. A progressive saturation effect begins there, reducing the rate
of information spread. The process has two stationary states, IS = 0 and IS = N.
The first state is unstable: the process cannot start as long as nobody knows
about the new product. As soon as one individual is informed, I(t) will increase.
The second state is stable: the entire population is informed.
Consider again a potential market of 1000 individuals, for which the word-
of-mouth effect represents the only way for information to be spread. At the
initial time, 25 individuals are informed. Figure 1-2 depicts the growth in the
number of informed policyholders for various values of the word-of-mouth
coefficient b.
2.3. Advertising and Word-of-Mouth
Bass (1969) combines both the advertising and word-of-mouth effects in the fol-
lowing non-linear differential equation, of the Ricatti type.
dt
dI t] g = [a + bI (t) /N ] [N – I (t)]
The solution of the equation is
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The number of informed asymptotically grows to N. I (t) has a concave shape
if b ≤ a, and a sigmoidal shape if b > a. The importance of the word-of-mouth
effect constantly increases with time. External influences are mostly important
at the beginning of the process. In particular, if I(t0) = 0, only external influences
will allow the information process to start.
Note these implicit assumptions in the above presentation:
1. Informed and non-informed individuals have a symmetrical role. This implies
that the rate of information curve is symmetric with respect to the inflection
point. This point is reached before half of the population is informed.
2. The population is homogeneous in its socio-economic characteristics, and
uniformly spread in space.
3. Only two classes of individuals are considered. Steps in the information process
are not considered. Informed people never forget.
4. The information process is not dependent on the existence of another, possi-
bly similar product, on the market.
5. The model is deterministic. Randomness can be incorporated in the informa-
tion process through a stochastic model (Bartholomew, 1982).
3. APPLICATION: TWO COMPANIES IN COMPETITION. THE BASIC MODEL.
Given that deregulation in insurance markets allows insurance companies to
design their own BMS, how will aggressive or passive behavior affect market
shares? The following exploratory model aims to identify the main parameters
driving the evolution of market shares. A simple model of competition between
two companies will be progressively refined to analyze the “shock” of the intro-
duction of a new BMS in a market. While simplified, this model attempts to
illustrate the observed behavior of Portuguese and Belgian insurers, where BMS
competition has mostly led to the creation of more bonus classes, and an increase
of the maximum discount. We consider a stable two-company market, and
explore the consequences of a BMS “shock”, the introduction of a “super-dis-
count” class by one of the companies.
Assume that only companies A and B operate in a given market. They both
apply the same BMS, a nine-class system described in Table 1. Each insurer
has used this system for such a long time that the stationary condition has been
attained. Each applies the same rates, so that each has a 50% market share.
Each company has 10,000 policyholders (see among others Lemaire, 1995, for
actuarial models to analyze BMS.)
We do not consider other classification variables in this analysis. Obviously, the
design of a BMS cannot be considered independently of other rating variables
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(Taylor, 1997, Gisler, 1996, Portugal, 2001.) A company using many rating vari-
ables has lesser need for a sophisticated BMS while a company using little seg-
mentation needs to implement a tougher BMS. We thus assume that companies
A and B use the same a priori variables, surcharges and discounts.
The distribution of the number of claims of each policyholder is assumed
to follow a Poisson with parameter l. The distribution of l in the portfolio is
a Gamma, hence the portfolio distribution of loss counts is a negative bino-
mial. Assume that the mean of the negative binomial is 0.10, and its variance
0.1063, corresponding to a typical accident pattern of European drivers. For
computational simplicity, the Gamma has been discretized. Ten values of l,
presented in Table 2, have been selected so that their mean and variance respec-
tively amount to 0.10 and 0.0063 (this leads to a negative binomial mean of 0.10
and a variance of 0.1063. Note that with these values, the skewness and higher
order moments are slightly underestimated; however, this is a third order effect.)
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TABLE 1
INITIAL BONUS-MALUS SYSTEM
CLASS PREMIUM LEVEL TRANSITION RULES
9 200 * Starting Class: 6
8 160
7 130 * Discount per claim-free year: 1 class
6 100
5 90 * Penalty per claim: 3 classes
4 80
3 70
2 60
1 50
TABLE 2
SELECTED VALUES OF l
GROUP l PERCENTILE IN THE GAMMA DISTRIBUTION
1 0.01081 3.88%
2 0.02536 13.08%
3 0.03918 22.98%
4 0.05363 33.25%
5 0.06952 43.73%
6 0.08774 54.32%
7 0.10971 64.95%
8 0.13815 75.51%
9 0.17982 85.84%
10 0.28608 96.74%
Further assume that the mean cost of an accident is $10,000, and that all expense
and profit loadings have been incorporated into this figure. These assumptions
lead to an annual premium income of $10 million for each insurer.
The initial 10,000 policyholders in each company are equally divided among
these 10 groups; we assume that there is no improvement in any individual’s
driving ability. The steady-state or stationary distribution of policyholders, for
each value of l, can be obtained by calculating the left eigenvector of the tran-
sition matrix, corresponding to an eigenvalue of 1. Aggregating across all
classes for each value of l, we find the distribution of policyholders for each
company, presented in Table 3.
Surveys of policyholders have consistently demonstrated some reluctance to
switch insurers. 54% of 2,462 respondents to a survey by Cummins et al (1974)
confessed never to have shopped around for auto insurance prices. To the ques-
tion “Which is the most important factor in your decision to buy insurance?”,
40% responded the company, 29% the agent, and only 27% the premium.
A similar survey of 2,004 Germans (Schlesinger and von der Schulenberg, 1993)
indicated that only 35% chose their carrier on the basis of their favorable pre-
mium, despite the fact that 67% of those responding knew that considerable
price differences exist between automobile insurers. Therefore we will initially
assume that, given the opportunity to switch for a reduced premium, one-third
of the policyholders will do so.
4. BENCHMARK SCENARIO #1:
COMPANY B INTRODUCES ANOTHER DISCOUNT CLASS. A DOES NOT REACT.
Assume that, at time 0, rating freedom is introduced in the market, and that
all policies are renewed annually, at times 0,1,2,… A few weeks before time 1,
company B announces that it will introduce a new class, class 0, with a premium
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF POLICYHOLDERS AT TIME 0
CLASS NUMBER OF POLICYHOLDERS
9 199.49
8 204.91
7 268.67
6 286.78
5 294.52
4 697.21
3 610.91
2 538.49
1 6,899.02
TOTAL 10,000.00
level of 40. All other premium levels and the transition rules remain unchanged.
Company A decides not to change its system. Neither company changes its
basic premium – the dollar amount it charges at level 100 – at that time. Some
of the class 1 policyholders of company A, who qualify for this super discount
class by being in A’s class 1 and having no claim during the period, will switch
to company B to take advantage of the extra discount. This results in an over-
all premium decrease in the market, and both companies lose money. B loses
money because of the discounted premiums in the new class while A loses
money because the quality of its portfolio deteriorates: many of its best drivers,
in profitable class 1, switch to B. Basic premiums are assumed to be adapted
retrospectively, at time 2, in such a way that the financial balance is restored
for the current portfolio. The first year loss is never recouped, a strategy com-
mon during price wars.
The same process is repeated annually: some policyholders switch, resulting
in modified market shares and in a gain or loss for each company. These one-
year gains or losses are never recouped, but each company adjusts premiums
one year later, taking into account the new mean premium level and the new
portfolio claim frequency. Income stability is, however, never achieved, as some
insureds immediately take advantage of the new rate information to switch car-
riers. Table 4 summarizes the evolution of the portfolios over the first 10 years.
This scenario leads to a complete elimination of company A in a few years,
as evidenced by figure 2-1, the evolution of the market shares. At time 1, one-
third of the claim-free drivers from A’s class 1 switch to B’s class 0. B gains 2,140
new policyholders in the process. Moreover, these are better-than-average dri-
vers, as B’s claim frequency for year 2 drops from 10% to 9.47%. However, B’s
average premium level decreases from the steady-state 63.86 to 54.36 because
of the extra discount. B has to increase its basic premium rate by 11.27%. A’s
average premium level has increased to 67.63, but its claim frequency is now
10.81%. A’s basic premium needs to be increased by 2.12%.
As a result of these differentiated premium increases, B’s rates at time 2 are
higher than A’s in all classes, except of course the new class 0. Consequently,
while some claim-free policies from A’s class 1 will switch to B’s class 0, all others
switches will go the other way: A receives new policyholders from B’s other
classes. As a result, market shares change negligibly, but a selection process is
beginning to take place, with the best policyholders concentrating in B’s port-
folio. B’s claim frequency drops to 8.62% while A’s increases to 12.24%. A has
to increase its basic rate by 4.07%, while B’s rate hardly has to change.
A similar pattern of switches takes place at times 3 and 4. B attracts many
of A’s good drivers, and sends away some of its worst drivers. Market shares
do not change appreciably, but A’s portfolio progressively deteriorates. Com-
pany A needs important annual price increases. The improvement in B’s port-
folio allows a slight decrease in its premiums. At time 5, A’s premiums become
higher than B’s in all classes. From that time on, one-third of A’s policy-
holders switch to B every year, and A progressively disappears from the market.
At time 15, its market share is under 2.8%. B has taken over the entire market,
and only had to pay a reasonable price, as its surplus has been depleted by only
$1,626,000. A’s surplus has been reduced by nearly as much.
BONUS-MALUS SYSTEMS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 307
308 K.S. VISWANATHAN AND J. LEMAIRE
T
A
B
L
E
 4
SC
E
N
A
R
IO
#
1
T
im
e
t=
0
t=
1
t=
2
t=
3
t=
4
C
om
pa
ny
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
1.
#
 o
f
po
lic
ie
s
10
,0
00
10
,0
00
7,
85
9
12
,1
41
7,
62
5
12
,3
75
7,
46
9
12
,5
31
7,
36
5
12
,6
35
2.
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
re
m
iu
m
 L
ev
el
63
.8
6
63
.8
6
67
.6
3
54
.3
6
73
.5
5
49
.3
9
76
.7
3
46
.6
1
78
.3
4
45
.0
4
3.
M
ar
ke
t 
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
ev
el
63
.8
6
59
.5
8
58
.6
0
57
.8
6
57
.3
0
4.
E
xp
ec
te
d 
#
 o
f
cl
ai
m
s
1,
00
0
1,
00
0
85
0
1,
15
0
93
3
1,
06
7
98
9
1,
01
1
1,
02
6
97
4
5.
C
la
im
 F
re
qu
en
cy
10
.0
0%
10
.0
0%
10
.8
1%
9.
47
%
12
.2
4%
8.
62
%
13
.2
4%
8.
07
%
13
.9
4%
7.
71
%
6.
N
ex
t 
P
re
m
iu
m
 I
nc
re
as
e
2.
12
%
11
.2
7%
4.
07
%
0.
17
%
3.
69
%
-0
.8
1%
3.
06
%
–1
.1
3%
7.
P
re
m
iu
m
 in
co
m
e 
(0
00
’s
)
$
10
,0
00
$
10
,0
00
$
8,
32
4
$
10
,3
35
$
8,
96
9
$
10
,6
48
$
9,
53
7
$
10
,1
93
$
9,
95
6
$
9,
85
1
8.
C
la
im
s 
(0
00
’s
)
$
10
,0
00
$
10
,0
00
$
8,
50
0
$
11
,5
00
$
9,
33
4
$
10
,6
66
$
9,
88
9
$
10
,1
11
$
10
,2
60
$
9,
74
0
9.
A
nn
ua
l P
ro
fit
 (
00
0’
s)
$
–
$
–
$
(1
76
)
$
(1
,1
65
)
$
(3
65
)
$
(1
8)
$
(3
52
)
$
82
$
(3
04
)
$
11
1
T
im
e
t=
5
t=
6
t=
7
t=
8
t=
9
t=
10
C
om
pa
ny
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
1.
4,
91
0
15
,0
90
3,
27
3
16
,7
27
2,
18
2
17
,8
18
1,
45
5
18
,5
45
97
0
19
,0
30
64
7
19
,3
53
2.
76
.4
9
50
.5
4
75
.2
5
52
.8
5
74
.4
1
53
.9
1
73
.7
7
54
.4
2
73
.2
8
54
.6
5
72
.9
1
54
.7
6
3.
56
.9
1
56
.5
2
56
.1
5
55
.8
3
55
.5
6
55
.3
5
4.
68
4
1,
31
6
45
6
1,
54
4
30
4
1,
69
6
20
3
1,
79
7
13
5
1,
86
5
90
1,
91
0
5.
13
.9
3%
8.
72
%
13
.9
3%
9.
23
%
13
.9
3%
9.
52
%
13
.9
3%
9.
69
%
13
.9
3%
9.
80
%
13
.9
3%
9.
87
%
6.
2.
41
%
0.
82
%
1.
65
%
1.
21
%
1.
13
%
1.
10
%
0.
88
%
0.
86
%
0.
66
%
0.
68
%
0.
24
%
-0
.6
2%
7.
$
6,
67
9
$
13
,0
53
$
4,
48
6
$
15
,2
56
$
3,
00
6
$
16
,7
75
$
2,
00
9
$
17
,8
20
$
1,
34
2
$
18
,5
22
$
89
6
$
19
,0
03
8.
$
6,
84
0
$
13
,1
60
$
4,
56
0
$
15
,4
40
$
3,
04
0
$
16
,9
60
$
2,
02
7
$
17
,9
73
$
1,
35
1
$
18
,6
49
$
89
8
$
18
,8
86
9.
$
(1
61
)
$
(1
07
)
$
74
)
$
(1
84
)
$
(3
4)
$
(1
85
)
$
(1
8)
$
(1
53
)
$
(9
)
$
(1
27
)
$
(2
)
$
11
7
C
um
ul
at
ed
 P
ro
fit
$
(1
,4
95
)
$
(1
,6
26
)
Figure 3-1 shows the evolution of the claim frequencies in the two portfo-
lios, and further illustrates the two phases of this scenario. During phase 1
(up to time 4), B progressively improves its portfolio by attracting A’s best
drivers, and eliminating some of its own worst drivers. A has to increase its rates
so much that it becomes more expensive than B in all classes from time 5 on.
A is then eliminated from the market during this second phase.
OUTCOME: Company A is eliminated from the market in a two-phase process.
B attracts A’s profitable customers in phase 1, then takes over the market in
phase 2.
5. OTHER SCENARIOS
5.1. Scenario #2: A reacts by creating a super-discount class.
Under Scenario #1, company A passively watches its portfolio being taken over
by B, and never uses its surplus to engage in a competitive battle. In Scenario #2,
we assume that, at time 5, A creates a super-discount class 0, with a premium
level of 35. Figure 2-2 shows that A manages not only to recover its former
market shares, but eventually succeeds in eliminating B from the market.
OUTCOME: B is eliminated from the market.
Under the first two scenarios, the most aggressive insurer eventually manages
to drive its competitor out of the market. Before concluding that rating free-
dom will result in tougher BMS and less solidarity among policyholders, we
must consider the effect of more realistic assumptions.
5.2. Scenario #3: Entry and Exit of Policyholders in the Market.
We now modify Scenario #1 by introducing entry and exit of drivers in the
portfolios. In the above two scenarios, we assumed a closed market with 20,000
policyholders. Now we still consider a constant 20,000 drivers, however 5%
or 1,000 drivers leave the market each year and 1,000 enter as new drivers.
We assume that 5% of policyholders leave each class of the system in each
l group. Per the rules of this BMS, new policyholders enter at class 6. Main-
taining the assumption that one-third of the policyholders compare premiums
before choosing an insurer, one-third of newcomers chooses the company
with the lower entry premium, while the remaining two-thirds are evenly split
across the two companies. This entry and exit of policyholders occurs every
period.
The evolution of market shares, shown in figure 2-3, reveals that both
companies survive in the market and maintain almost equal market shares,
a dramatically different result from Scenario #1. Company A, being cheaper
than Company B in the early years, receives most of the new drivers, thus
enabling it to stabilize its portfolio. There is no need for company A to react
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by introducing a new class. Figure 3-2 shows the evolution of claim frequencies,
demonstrating a niche effect: company A specializes in insuring the worst risks,
at a higher price.
OUTCOME: Both companies survive with similar market shares, B attracting all
good risks, A specializing in sub-standard risks.
5.3. Scenario #4: Threshold
We now examine the effect of a different modification to Scenario #1, the intro-
duction of a threshold, an amount the premium difference between the two
insurers must exceed to entice a policyholder to switch. In the Cummins et al
(1974) survey, only 13% of respondents claimed that they would switch carriers
for a premium decrease of less than 10%. 22% would switch for a decrease
between 10% and 19%, 29% require a decrease in excess of 20%, and 35%
were not sure. Changing companies involves search and switching costs. Search
costs include the costs of time and effort taken in contacting various insurers
and providing the necessary paperwork. Some of the monetary switching costs
include, for instance, the loss of a family rebate or the loss of a discount for
a combined auto-homeowners policy. Other costs are non-pecuniary, stem-
ming from loyalty to a particular insurer or agent that has developed during
a long-term relationship. Therefore, we will assume that, given the opportunity
to switch for a lower premium, one-third of all policyholders will change, but
only if the premium reduction is at least $100 (which corresponds to 10% of
the expected cost of annual claims).
Market shares, shown in figure 2-4, indicate that company B still takes over
the market, but at a slower pace. The switching of policyholders from A to B
occurs almost uniformly over time, as B becomes cheaper than A each period
for a growing group of classes.
OUTCOME: A threshold in policyholder decisions slows down the evolution of
market shares.
5.4. Scenario #5: Expense Breakdown
We examine here the effect of allocating expenses to specific functions. We had
assumed in all above scenarios that the $10,000 claim cost included all expenses.
Now, we assume 35% of expenses broken down as follows:
1/3 proportional to premiums collected (commissions, for example)
1/3 proportional to claims (claim-related expenses)
1/3 proportional to the number of policies (per policy expenses)
We expect that this would penalize company B, since now expenses are more
closely linked with market share. Indeed, the addition of this assumption to
the original Scenario #1 results in a marked slowdown in the evolution of market
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shares, depicted in figure 2-5. Company B only begins to drastically take over
the market at time 7, versus time 5 under Scenario #1.
OUTCOME: Expenses more linked to market shares slow down the evolution of
market shares.
Our exploratory model illustrates the effects of several parameters that con-
tribute to the evolution of market shares. Each of the scenarios presented
considers separate introduction of more realistic assumptions. Incorporating
various combinations of assumptions into the model lead to slightly different
outcomes.
In the scenarios presented so far, it was assumed that given the opportunity
to switch insurers for a more favorable premium, a random one-third insureds
does so. This proportion represented the number of individuals who undergo
the searching and switching process. More realistically, the number of indivi-
duals who learn about an innovation in the market is a function of the level
of advertising as well as the degree of interpersonal contact. Information diffu-
sion regarding the new BMS and its effect on the market are explored in the next
four scenarios. We assume that expenses are allocated to specific functions,
similar to the breakdown of Scenario #5.
5.5. Scenario #6. Scenario #1 with information diffusion, a = 0.10, b = 0.25.
Consider Scenario #1 where company B adds a class 0 with a premium level
of 40 to its BMS. Policyholders learn about the new BMS through the media,
an effect captured through parameter a of the Bass model. Parameter b denotes
the word-of-mouth effect, mainly impacted by the level of policyholder sophis-
tication and interest in BMS. We are essentially incorporating a discretized
version of the Bass approach into the basic model, assuming I (0) = 0.
Keeping a constant 20,000 policyholders spread over the 10 different l’s,
with a = 0.10, by time 1, a*N = 2,000 drivers become informed, 1,000 in each
company. They undergo a search process, comparing the premium they would
be charged by each company. We assume that an informed policyholder will
certainly switch insurers for a more favorable premium. Since at time 1, premi-
ums are identical across all classes except class 0, the only informed indivi-
duals who switch are those in company A, who qualify for B’s class 0, about
642 drivers. The other 358 informed drivers in A remain with that company.
B must raise its premiums 10.14% at time 2, while A’s increase is a negligible 0.25%.
At time 2, B is more expensive across all classes except in class 0, a position
that remains over time. Thus, from time 2 onwards, those policyholders in B
who become informed switch to A, while B progressively receives the best drivers.
Figure 1-3 depicts the information diffusion process.
By time 10, over 90% of policyholders are informed about the innova-
tion and base their insurer choice on premium comparisons. Market shares by
company are presented in figure 2-6. Company B is achieving a niche effect,
attracting the best drivers, while A manages to survive by servicing a port-
folio with lesser quality drivers. Market shares appear to reach a steady-state.
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Both insurers survive with substantial market shares, but with different port-
folio compositions.
OUTCOME: Both companies survive. B has a larger market share with the better
drivers. A manages to survive by servicing lesser-quality drivers.
5.6. Scenario #7. Scenario #1 with advertising shocks, a(1) = a(2) = 0.30, a(t) =
0.10 for t ≥ 3, b = 0.25.
Company B can speed up the process to steady-state by increasing its adver-
tising at times 1 and 2, logical times given that the new system is introduced then.
a(1) and a (2) are set at 0.30. An advertising shock, increased media effort or
agent persuasion, allows more policyholders to become informed initially. This
speeds up the initial information process and facilitates increased interpersonal
communication. Assume that a reverts to 0.10 at time 3 and remains at that level.
As depicted in figure 2-7, similar switching behaviors occur and B achieves its
steady-state position at a faster rate.
OUTCOME: Timely advertising enables B to achieve its objectives faster.
5.7. Scenario #8. Scenario #3 with information diffusion, a = 0.10, b = 0.25.
In Scenario #3, we incorporated into the basic model entry and exit of policy-
holders. Each year, 5% of policyholders leave the automobile insurance market.
1,000 new drivers enter in class 6. Movement into and out of the portfolios has
implications on the proportion of informed individuals in the market. Each
year, a portion of informed drivers ceases driving while 1,000 new uninformed
drivers join the market. As Figure 2-8 shows, both companies co-exist with rela-
tively equal market shares.
OUTCOME: Entries and exits slow down the information process, which helps
company A maintain a market share near 50%.
5.8. Scenario #9. Scenario #3 with advertising shocks, a(1) = a(2) = 0.30, a(t) =
0.10 for t ≥ 3, b = 0.25.
Again, company B can speed up the information process with increased adver-
tising during the first and second periods, as shown in figure 2-9. Given that
market shares become essentially equal, B must weigh the costs with the benefits
of such an advertising shock.
OUTCOME: Advertising does not help company B in this case.
312 K.S. VISWANATHAN AND J. LEMAIRE
BONUS-MALUS SYSTEMS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 313
FIGURE 1-3. Scenario #6.
FIGURE 1-2. Information Spread through Word of Mouth.
FIGURE 1. Informed Individuals
FIGURE 1-1. Information Spread through Advertising
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FIGURE 2-3. Scenario #3.
FIGURE 2-2. Scenario #2.
FIGURE 2. Evolution of Market Shares.
FIGURE 2-1. Scenario #1.
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FIGURE 2-6. Scenario #6.
FIGURE 2-5. Scenario #5.
FIGURE 2-4. Scenario #4.
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FIGURE 2-9. Scenario #9.
FIGURE 2-8. Scenario #8.
FIGURE 2-7. Scenario #7.
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FIGURE 3-2. Scenario #3.
FIGURE 3. Evolution of Claim Frequencies.
FIGURE 3-1. Scenario #1.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Many different scenarios concerning the diffusion of information among
prospective consumers of a new BMS have been analyzed. Various assumptions
concerning expenses, entries and exits in the markets, and policyholder purchas-
ing decisions have been tested. Very different outcomes have resulted: one or
the other company can be eliminated from the market; both companies can
survive, with equal or different market shares. Portfolios after a competition
war can be similar, or very different, as each company can find a niche by spe-
cializing in servicing some categories of drivers.
This extreme variety of market outcomes leads to an important conclusion:
before engaging in BMS competition, a thorough knowledge of market con-
ditions and policyholder behavior is essential. Companies should not adopt
an aggressive strategy in the design of a new BMS unless they are reasonably
confident about consumers’ reactions. Surveys of policyholders seem essential
prior to any aggressive competitive strategy.
Our simple model could be extended in a variety of ways:
• Diffusion theory belongs to the class of the so-called “first-purchase” models.
Repeat-purchase models could be developed to incorporate the fact that, in
insurance, there is a flow of new customers every year, but also a portfolio
of existing customers who may base their renewal decision on other factors
than newcomers.
• We have focused on insurers’ market shares, without considering the evo-
lution of surpluses. A more sophisticated model could include the cost of
designing and advertising a new BMS, as well as the level of the companies’
solvency margins, or even the level of prudence in claims reserving.
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